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L

ARGUMENT

A. APPELLANT DOES NOT MISCHARACTERIZE THE RECORD OR
EVIDENCE.
In his Reply Brief, Respondent (hereinafter "Respondent" or "Amundson")
asserts that Appellant has misstated the record, or has made arguments not supported by
.evidence. More specifically, in footnote one of Respondent's Brief, Respondent states:
In the Amended Complaint, Appellant asserts that tenant Roger
Amundson, (hereinafter "Roger"), co-hosted the party on July 8, 2011.
However, there is no evidence in the record to support this assertion, as it
is undisputed in the record that Jon Sullivan hosted the party and
personally invited the Respondent to attend the party in the early morning
hours of July 8, 2011. See Respondent's Briefp. I footnote I.
It should be noted that Appellant alleged that Roger co-hosted the party in

his First Amended Complaint, prior to the discovery phase of this case, and
pursuant to Idaho's notice pleading standard. This initial allegation was not made
in any attempt to allege facts not in evidence.
Next, in footnote two of Respondent's Brief, Respondent suggests that
Appellant completely mischaracterized the record by stating:
Appellant asserts there is "no dispute that Amundson has exercised
complete authority and control over the property since purchase in 2007."
This statement was made without citation and completely mischaracterizes
the record, as it is undisputed that there were three tenants occupying the
property pursuant to lease agreements at the time of Mr. Stiles' accident.
See Respondent's Briefp. 2 footnote 2.
Appellant supported the statement there 1s "no dispute that Amundson has
exercised complete authority and control over the property since purchase in 2007" with
Amundson's own deposition testimony.

At deposition, Amundson testified that he

maintained the property, performing all necessary maintenance and repairs, and
occasionally supervising maintenance and repairs, if Roger or another tenant were willing

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - J

to assist with a task. Amundson testified that all decisions regarding maintenance or
projects on the property were at his sole discretion and wholly for his benefit as owner of
the property. (R. pp. 114, 124-125). See Appellant's Opening Briefp. 9. Amundson also
testified that the acts ofremoving the window and placing it on the fence were all done at
his direction. (R. p. 125).
In his Opening Brief Respondent additionally suggested that Appellant
mischaracterized the evidence by stating:
Appellant states in his Opening Brief (p. 6.) that "the window was
eventually placed against a cedar fence in the house's adjacent walkway."
This Statement mischaracterizes the evidence to the extent it implies that
Walter Amundson has any role in moving the window from the white
picket fence next to the driveway to the cedar fence further back on the
side of the property or that he knew that the window was located next to
the cedar fence at the time of the alleged accident. The record reflects that
Walter Amundson played no role in moving the window from the area of
the driveway against the white picket fence and had no awareness that it
had become broken or had been moved against the cedar fence prior to the
accident. (R. pp. 48-49). The only facts in the record are that Roger
moved the window himself. See Respondent's Briefp. 3 footnote 3.

It is undisputed, and supported by substantial deposition testimony, that the window was

eventually placed against a cedar fence in the house's adjacent walkway. (R. pp. 142,
143, 233).

Additionally, roommate Wayne Jenkins ("Jenkins") initially testified at

deposition that Walter and his Son moved the window from its initial position, fmiher up
the walkway. (R. p. 233). Jenkins later recanted this statement, and testified that "I don't
know if Walter had, but all I know is that Roger moved it." (R. p. 233). This conflicting
testimony raises a question of fact regarding whether Amundson assisted in moving the
window. Amundson additionally testified at deposition he was at the property to collect
rent from his tenants immediately prior to the accident, either on July 5 or 6, 2011, which
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was only two or three days prior to the date of the accident. Amundson was able to
initially recall this visit, since Sullivan was usually paid on the fifth day of each month.
(R. p. 118).

Amundson and Roger also testified to the size and weight of the window.
Amundson testified that the window was eight foot long, four foot high, and "when
you're lifting 200 pounds you want to set it down as soon as possible." (R. p. 119). At
deposition Roger initially testified that the window weighed a good five hundred pounds,
and at least five hundred pounds. (R. p. 141 ). Roger then testified that the window
maybe did not weigh that much, maybe like 250, maybe 300, but it was heavy. (R. p.
141 ). Roger also testified that he dragged the window about 20 feet. (R. 140).
Provided the foregoing facts, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether Amundson knew, or should have known, the window was moved up the alley,
and whether Amundson may have assisted in moving the window, and whether such a
large object could have been moved by Roger alone.
On appeal, Respondent has again relied upon his own, self-serving, affidavit to
support his factual assertions, ignoring the testimony elicited at a number of depositions
during the discovery phase of this case. 1

Regardless of Respondent's assertions

Appellant has neither mischaracterized the record, nor the evidence.

1

In its Summary Judgment briefing, Respondent relied almost exclusively on his own
self-serving affidavit, ignoring salient facts elicited at deposition. On appeal, Respondent
again attempts to minimize the extensive deposition testimony taken in this case.
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B. THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND THE
STANDARD SET FORTH BY THIS COURT IN STEPHENS AND APPLY
THE STANDARD OF ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE TO
RESPONDENT.

In his Response, Respondent states that the appellant:
Seeks to either eliminate the distinctions between invitees and licensees
altogether, or expand the duties of a landlord such that all entrants on a
rental property should be classified as licensees, and by doing so, the
Appellant asks this Court to ignore established precedent and the logical
and sound public policy reasons why Idaho appellate courts have declined
to expand a landlord's premises liability duties to a social guest (licensee)
of tenant. See Respondent 's Briefp. 9.
What Appellant seeks, as argued in his Opening Brie( is for this Court to apply
the tried and true negligence standard to landlords, and employ the modern approach to
duty establishing "a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258 267 P.2d 41, 50 (1984).

This

is a good faith argument, supported by this Court's decision in Stephens, decisions from
other jurisdictions, and sound public policy reasons. Decisions from other jurisdictions
supporting the application of the foregoing standard, and a detailed analysis of this
Court's decision in Stephens were provided in depth in Appellant's Opening Brief, and
will not be repeated here. However, as recognized by other jurisdictions, and relied upon
by this Court in Stephens decision, the public policy considerations supporting the
adoption of this standard are considerable. This Court held, "while continuing to pay lip
service to the general rule, the courts have expended considerable energy and exercised
great ingenuity in attempting to fit various settings into the recognized exceptions." Id. at
258. Thus, employing the negligence standard, and adopting duty of "reasonable care in
light of all the circumstances" promotes judicial economy.
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Other jurisdictions have found that "the better public policy lies in the
abandonment of the general rule of nonliability, and further questions of control, hidden
defects, and common use would be relevant only as bearing on the general determination
of negligence, including foreseeability and unreasonableness of the risk of harm."

Pagelsdmf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (Wis. 1979). Hence, other
jurisdictions have found it better to employ the negligence analysis, rather than the
outdated, common-law approach promoting non-liability. The negligence analysis does
not increase liability for landowners, it simply subjects landowners to the traditional and
trusted

method of determining negligence,

which

includes foreseeability,

and

unreasonableness of the risk of harm.
Finally, the practical result of failing to hold landlords to a reasonable duty of care
1s that landlords are discouraged to perform repairs of rented premises.

Young v.

Garwicki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980). There is no sound public policy
behind encouraging landlords not to maintain and upkeep a rented or leased premises.
Again, Appellant respectfully submits that the duty owed by Amundson does not
depend on Stiles' status on the property. In this factual scenario, Idaho law does not
recognize a difference in the duty owed by a landlord to licensees and invitees. The duty
owed by landlords to invitees and licensees alike should be to use due care to prevent
unreasonable and foreseeable risks of harm to both classes of persons. As Appellant has
argued previously, the proper standard of care is one of ordinary and reasonable care in
light of all the circumstances.
Despite Respondent's assertions to the contrary, as established by this Court in

Stephens, and as established in a number of other jurisdictions, in modem society, there is
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no justification to provide landlords the archaic common-law cloak of immunity. A
landowner's duty to tenants and social guests alike is, and should be, one of reasonable
care under the circumstances toward all who come onto the property.
C. THERE ARE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES TO FIND RESPONDENT

SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT REPAIR.
The standard regarding a landlord's duty to a social guest, as stated by the Court
of Appeals in Robinson v. Mueller is that "the landlord owes a duty to the extent that, if
the landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs on the premises, the landlord must exercise
reasonable care in performing such repairs." Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 23 7, 241
322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014). Contrary to Respondent's assertions, there was a repair
performed by Amundson on the property. Amundson directed a project to remove a large
bay window from the property's garage. (R. pp. 117, 119).

When the window was

removed, there was a large hole remaining, which had to be remodeled, and repaired in
order to accommodate a garage door.

Once the window was removed, one witness

referred to the area formerly containing the window as " the aftermath." (R. p. 189).
Once the window was removed, there is no doubt extensive repair work was done to
eventually frame in the garage door.
Part of the removal and repair project was the storage of the window. The record
supports the fact that Amundson spearheaded the removal and repair project.

As a

landowner he assumed the duty of reasonable care in performing such repair. As stated
in Appellant's Opening Brief, and further above, the window was very large, heavy, and
consisted of a number of glass panes. It is a question of fact whether Amundson met his
duty of reasonable care to Appellant when he initially stored the window in the walkway,
and when Amundson failed to follow up on the status and condition of the window on the
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premises that he owned and controlled, once the window had been shattered, and moved
to a different location, where it was known residents and guests could possibly travel at
night.
Respondent additionally concludes that the hazard at issue in this case is not the
broken window. (R. p. 25). Respondent suggests "the hazard at issue in this case is the
tree stump, not the broken window, and even without the presence of the broken window,
the Appellant would have tripped and injured himself." See Respondent's Brief, p. 25.
Appellant certainly could have tripped over a stump and injured himself. It is however
doubtful that Appellant could have suffered such severe injuries without the presence of a
sharp instrumentality, such as a shattered windowpane. At least one witness thought the
window was the hazard at issue. Roger testified that after Mr. Stiles was injured he broke
the rest of the glass out of the broken pane since it was a hazard, and he eliminated the
hazard so nobody else would hurt themselves. (R. p. 141 ). Roger went on to testify that
"he should have destroyed the window after Wayne broke the panel because none of this
would have occurred, and there wouldn't have been this hazard." (R. p. 145).
Based on the foregoing, there are plausible legal and factual arguments that
Amundson's negligent repair was the cause of Appellant's injuries, and the shattered
window presented a definite hazard. Genuine issues of material fact exist surrounding
whether Amundson' s repair was negligent, and a breach of his duty of ordinary and
reasonable care to Appellant. These are questions that should be submitted to a jury.
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11.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief,
this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court in granting summary
judgment. Accordingly, the case sub Judice should be remanded to the District Court for

further proceedings.

DATED: This

l

,-L
day of December 2015.
GILES LAW OFFICE, P.L.L.C.

Chip'f,-6-Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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